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This paper examines the determinants of the exit behaviour of banks in the Nigerian 
consolidation program during July 2004 and December 2005. We conceptualise the exit 
process in a flexible bivariate competing risks model to examine the importance of 
macroeconomic and industry-specific factors for both merged banks and failed banks 
jointly. The preliminary results suggest that bank-specific characteristics mattered more 
for preventing bank failure than they did for emergence of the M&A banks. Second, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria’s assistance was highly influential in preventing bank failure, 
and, for banks that benefited, the assistance increased their probability of being merged 
or acquired. Also, we found no strong evidence suggesting that the prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions and industry-specific factors had influenced exit behaviour 
of banks during the consolidation exercise. We found evidence of structural dependence 
between failure and merger and acquisition hazards induced by CBN incentive.  
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On July 6, 2004, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) announced a 13 point 
reform program expected to reposition the Nigerian banking industry in its role of enhancing 
economic growth and development of the country.
1
 An important component of the reform 
agenda was the recapitalization of banks with a minimum shareholders fund of N25 billion 
prescribed to be met by December 31, 2005. Towards this end, the CBN encouraged banks to 
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enter into mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
2
 The CBN also provided a range of incentives to 
accompany the implementation of the program. For example, a number of committees were 
instituted, whose terms of reference were expected to assist weaker and problem banks in 
facilitating their M&As (CBN 2004, 2005). 
As at the end of the program on December 31, 2005, the number of banks operating in 
Nigeria declined from 89 to 25, about 72 percent. Nineteen banks emerged from M&A involving 
70 banks and six banks remaining as stand-alone banks (i.e. banks that met the N25 billion 
without M&A). The remaining 13 banks did not scale through (or failed). Accordingly, the 
emerging 25 banks jointly accounted for about 93.5 percent of the total market deposits, while 
the remaining 13 failed banks accounted for the rest (6.5%): see CBN (2006).   
The Nigerian banking consolidation exercise represents an unprecedented change in 
institutional context in which bank M&A and failures occur. Firstly, it represents a regulatory 
policy-induced bank consolidation accompanied by a framework of facilitating incentives that 
permit banks to exit the industry through either M&A or failure. This differs markedly from the 
conventional situation in which bank M&A and failures result from voluntary decisions of the 
affected banks. The exit process in the Nigerian exercise was induced as part of an overall 
sectoral reform policy.  Also, the regulatory authority provided a range of incentives to assist 
banks in the exit process. This differs from the commonly observed situations where the 
regulatory authority merely approves the M&A decisions or liquidates failed banks. 
The different institutional context in which exit of banks had occurred raises certain 
questions of policy interest. These include: (i) How important were bank-specific characteristics 
in the emergence of M&A banks and those that failed? (ii) In what ways do these factors differ 
between M&A banks and failed banks? (iii) How important were the incentives provided by the 
CBN in facilitating exit among banks? (iv) How important were the prevailing macroeconomic 
and industry specific conditions in facilitating the outcome of the consolidation program? There 
had been no attempt to address these questions, despite their relevance to policy makers. This 
may be due largely to the generally held view that the exercise was intended to prevent mass 
failures (i.e. meeting the CBN capitalisation requirement). This is the reason for our research. 
Meanwhile, the economics of bank consolidation treats M&A decisions as any other 
investment decisions of both acquiring and target banks driven by potential synergies that may 
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arise from their mergers. Empirical evidence distinguishes between bank-specific characteristics 
that increase the likelihood of a bank acquiring another bank, be a takeover target, or failed bank. 
A large, well-capitalised and efficient bank has greater likelihood of acquiring a smaller, less 
efficient, low capitalised bank. Banks that are illiquid, have low quality assets or low capital, are 
more likely to fail. We do not know how important these and other bank characteristics were in 
the outcome of the Nigerian consolidation exercise. The policy document indicates that the CBN 
incentive was specifically designed to assist weaker and problem banks through up to 80% debt 
write-off (CBN 2005).  The idea behind the CBN incentive was based on the view that provision 
of this special forbearance to this group of banks by the CBN would improve their attractiveness 
to potential acquirers/investors, thereby preventing bank mass liquidation or failures and 
potential losses by the financial system. Yet not all of the problem or weak banks actually 
received the CBN incentive. 
Thus, understanding the role played by the CBN incentives in the consolidation exercise is 
of central importance for the outcomes as well as understanding the dimension of the difference 
between unassisted and assisted M&As. In the Nigerian case, a counterfactual question of 
interest to policy makers is whether the merged banks would have failed had they not received 
CBN incentive. Also, the fact that not all of the weaker/problem banks benefited from the CBN 
incentives raises a conceptual issue what underlies the selection process, which might not be 
publicly observable.
3
   
The goal of this paper therefore is to identify the determinants of exit behaviour of banks in 
the Nigerian banking consolidation program. It hopes to identify bank-specific characteristics 
that may explain the emergence of the M&A banks side-by-side the failed banks; examine the 
CBN incentives that influence exit behaviour of banks; and determine whether the prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions and industry specific factors influenced the exit behaviour of banks 
during the consolidation program. Understanding the interplay among these factors may help 
explain M&A decision of banks side-by-side failed banks in the Nigerian banking consolidation 
program. We explore the view that M&A decisions are not necessarily made to prevent failure. 
Thus, the emergence of M&A banks and failed banks in the Nigerian banking consolidation 
should be systematically related to factors other than to meeting the capitalisation requirement. 
This paper is organised into six sections. The next section introduces the reader to the 
background; section 3 establishes a brief overview of the concepts and literature on the 
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economics of the program. The methodology is explained in the next section and the results are 
presented in section 5 before ending this paper in section 6 with some conclusion.  
  
2. Banking in Nigeria and the Banking Sector Consolidation 
Between 1892 when banking started in Nigeria and 1952 when the legal framework for it was 
laid out, banking was largely an unregulated activity in Nigeria. Since 1952, there has been 
significant growth in size and structure of banks. Financial liberalization led to a loosening of the 
conditions for granting banking license and consequently a sharp rise occurred in the number of 
banks between 1986 and 1993. By 1992, there were 120 banks with 3,300 branches up from 15 
banks with 273 branches in 1970. A CBN stipulation that banks should have branches in major 
cities with CBN branches as a condition for direct cheque clearance led to a growth in branch 
expansion rate of 33.5 percent between 2001 and 2003. Banking distress reduced the number to 
89 by 2004 (with 26 banks collapsing in 1998 alone). The majority of banks were fragmented, 
small and marginal players with only about 10 of the banks controlling over 50 percent of total 
industry assets and deposits.  
At the initial periods of its growth, government ownership and participation in the industry 
was considered necessary for its survival. This was the case following the nationalization and 
indigenization programs of the mid-1970s. However, government presence in the industry fell 
drastically and, as can be seen from Table 1 below, the number has remained low. With the 
consolidation, the little government presence got eliminated. Prior to consolidation, the private 
banks mostly were tied to some families. About 11 banks had majority foreign interests; this 
number was reduced to 4 following the consolidation. Post consolidation, the family strength has 
been largely watered down with 21 of the banks now quoted on the floor of the Stock Exchange 
and only four banks still retaining majority foreign holding. 
Table 1: Ownership Structure of Nigerian Banks 
 
Status 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Privately 76 77 78 77 77 77 21 
Government 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Foreign 10 11 11 11 11 11 4 
Total 89 90 89 89 89 89 25 
 
As at mid-2004 when the new CBN Governor was appointed, the industry faced myriad 
challenges including operating within a slow and structurally impeded system, frequent changes 
International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 2
 23 
of policies about operations and government deposit management, periodic distress, weak credit 
regulation, poor management, macroeconomic and political instability, maturity mismatches, 
insider abuses, fraud and conflict of interest, general insecurity and corruption. Prior to this time, 
cultural and business model rigidities meant voluntary M&As were uncommon with only 11 
cases of partial consolidation between 1991 and 2001. The CBN consolidation changed this 
significantly.  
Following the announcement for all banks to raise their capital base, the apex bank set up a 
monitoring committee to oversee the program. However, it did not seem to have a monopoly 
and/or competition monitoring process or commission. It did bring in and pay for technical 
assistance to the banks; with most of such assistance consisting of payments for merger and 
acquisition experts. It also worked with the Securities and Exchange Commission to drastically 
reduce and in many cases, remove fees payable to the commission for such mergers and 
acquisitions. While banks handled software, operations and branch mergers, the apex bank 
allowed for a transition time for operations merger and regularization of employees for merged 
banks beyond the consolidation deadline.  
There was also special assistance that took the form of a special forbearance framework, 
which took effect on 6 April 2005. The special assistance had two components one of which is a 
write-off of 80 percent of debt owed CBN by the banks, subject to:  
 Recovery of non-performing owner/insider related loans and advances within two months 
 Injection of any shortfall in the banks’ capitalization to bring it up to a solvency status, 
also within two months; 
The CBN converted the balance of 20 percent of debt to a long term loan of a maximum of 7 
years at 3 percent per annum with two years moratorium. The CBN also announced that further 
forbearance on the balance of 20 percent of the debt could be extended to the new owners after 
its acquisition and meeting the N25 billion capital base. The idea was to increase attractiveness 
of the banks concerned and accelerate their M&A through debt write-off. Fortunately, the 
incentives were contingent upon recovery of nonperforming loans associated with owners and 
other insiders of the banks. This way, the CBN wanted to ensure that past mismanagement of 
banks were not rewarded. In its 2005 accounts, the CBN provided for these incentives by treating 
the loans to the affected banks as sunk and irrecoverable costs. The provision for the incentives 
to be contingent upon insider loan recovery led to only 11 banks actually benefitting from the 
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incentive provision. Besides, it started midway into the consolidation program and this may have 
impacted on the number of banks that benefited ultimately.  
The analysis in this paper is based on data from 89 banks over three years prior to the CBN’s 
consolidation program, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Descriptive statistics (as in Table 2) show that the 
average bank age was 16 years, with standard deviation of about 7 years difference between 
them. The youngest bank in the sample was 5 months old prior to announcement of 
consolidation while the oldest was 39 years old. The average bank had 33 branches, ranging 
from 3 branches to 351 branches across Nigeria. The standard deviation of the number of 
branches was estimated to be 55.  
The average bank had a capital base of N4.22 billion Naira with standard deviation of 7.46 
billion Naira, ranging from 0.1 billion Naira to 38.6 billion Naira. The average shareholders’ 
fund was estimated to be N1,350.77 million, with a standard deviation of 519.57 million Naira. 
In terms of loans, loans to SMEs was 7.65 percent of total loans with a standard deviation of 2.55 
while loans for agricultural purposes was estimated at an average of N223,553.20 million with a 
standard deviation of 17,147.86 million Naira. Finally, an average bank had 27.84 percent of 
their total loans as nonperforming prior to consolidation, with a standard deviation of 10.22 
percent. The proportion of nonperforming loans ranged between 6.5 percent for one bank and 
almost half of total loans (46.55%) for another. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Banks Prior to Consolidation 
Characteristic Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
   Minimum Maximum 
Number of branches 33.48 54.58 3 351 
Bank age 16.14 6.72 0.48 39.49 
Percent of SME loans 7.65 2.55 0.89 13.30 
Agric loans (millions of Naira) 223,553 17,147 200,856 242,185 
Percent of nonperforming loans 27.84 10.22 6.5 46.55 
Capital base (Billions of Naira) 4.22 7.46 0.10 38.60 
Shareholders’ fund (Millions of Naira) 1,350 519 430 3,500 
 
There were three outcomes observed among the 89 banks post-consolidation. These banks 
were generally classified into three groups, reflecting the post-consolidation outcome. A majority 
of the banks either formed voluntary mergers or were forced into mergers to survive the 
consolidation rules. In all, 70 banks fall into this category, representing 78.65% of the total (89) 
banks. In addition, there were 6 banks which stood alone post consolidation, representing 6.74% 
of the total (89) banks. The remaining 13 banks (representing 14.61 percent of the 89 banks) 
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failed after the consolidation exercise. In all, we compare the age, number of branches, 
proportion of nonperforming loans, proportion of loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
shareholders’ fund as well as capital base (Table 3). 
Table 3: Comparing Banks by Exit Type 
Characteristic Standalone Consolidated Failed 
 Mean (standard deviation) 
Number of branches 24.17 (21.77) 36.33 (60.50) 22.38 (17.19) 
Bank age (years) 10.39 (7.32) 16.98 (6.86) 14.26 (3.12) 
Percent of SME loans 5.84 (2.46) 7.49 (2.51) 9.35 (1.89) 
Percent of nonperforming loans 9.84 (1.57) 27.16 (8.40) 39.96 (5.45) 
Capital base (Billions of Naira) 16.38 (10.22) 3.59 (6.86) 2.00 (2.61) 








3. Overview of Relevant Literature 
3.1 The Economics of Bank Consolidation 
The economics of bank consolidation is based on the theory of incentives for M&A. Economic 
theory of incentives for M&A relies on two main points of view: the wealth maximisation of 
shareholders and managerial self-interest (O’Keefe 1996). The wealth maximisation theory treats 
M&A decisions as any other investment decisions of both acquiring and target banks driven by 
potential synergies that may arise from their merger. For example, synergy is said to occur when 
the merged entity performs better than both of the banks individually or the long-term market 
value of the merged entity becomes greater than the simple sum of the individual banks. Sources 
of such synergies include portfolio risk diversification, economies of scale and scope, expansion 
into new geographical markets, technology, market power, and so on.  
On the other hand, the notion of managerial self-interest is based on the view that M&A 
decisions can be driven by managers pursuing their self-interests rather than the interests of the 
owners or equity shareholders (Hardlock, et al. 1999, Ely and Song 2000, Kwan 2004), 
especially if managers are not well represented in the Board of Directors (O’Keefe 1996).  From 
this point of view, M&A decisions create agency conflicts that result from divergence between 
shareholders’ wealth maximization interests and managers’ interests. The managerial self-
interest theory predicts that where an M&A places managers at risk of job loss, those managers 
at risk have incentive to block M&A attempts or make M&A decisions that reduce their 
employment risk but which might not necessarily translate into increased wealth of 




  Ely and Song (2000) provide a review of the US evidences that appear to 
support the managerial self-serving behaviour.  
3.2 Empirical Evidence 
Empirical studies analysing banking M&A and bank failures generally draw upon the above 
theories to identify bank financial and other specific characteristics to examine the likelihood 
that a bank will acquire another bank (acquirer), be a takeover target, be distressed, or fail. 
However, these studies vary widely in terms of their focus, institutional contexts as well as in 
analytical methods. Hence, results are far from conclusive. We identify two strands of studies 
that allow us to highlight the major research questions we intend to address in this paper.   
Studies Analysing Bank M&A in a Developed Countries 
The first strand of studies identified generally estimate logit models to examine bank 
characteristics that determine the likelihood of a bank being an acquirer or a takeover target 
using various US samples of banks. A feature of this strand of studies is that they do not analyse 
bank failures.
6
 A major approach is to examine the relative importance of measures of 
profitability (E.g. earnings) and other bank characteristics in distinguishing between acquirers 
and target banks (Hannan and Rhoades 1987, Amel and Rhoades 1989, O’Keefe 1996, Hadlock 
et al. 1999, Wheelock and Wilson 2000).
7
  
Results from this strand of studies are largely inconclusive. A group of the studies found 
negative relationship between a bank’s profitability and the likelihood of being acquired (Amel 
and Rhoades 1989; Wheelock and Wilson 2000). Another group found no evidence supporting 
profitability measures and the likelihood of a bank acquisition (Hannan and Rhoades 1987; 
Hadlock et al. 1999). In particular, this latter group found that acquirers are likely to be banks 
with large market shares, relatively larger (in asset size), adequate equity capital, sound financial 
position, high profit rates necessary to attract additional capital, well rated management quality 
and location.  On the other hand, target banks are likely to be small in size, poorly managed, 
inefficient, low capitalised banks. Rather than earnings, Hadlock et al. (1999) found that the 
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5
 O’Keefer (1996) also considers the role of third party interests such as those of investment bankers and security 
dealers in facilitating mergers. These third parties can profit from a merger transaction even when the expected 
benefits to the acquiring bank’s shareholders are not obvious.    
6
 This may be due to the fact that large bank failures are relatively less prevalent in the USA.  
7
 Hadlock et al. (1999) used matching technique. 
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likelihood of being acquired is lower the larger the ownership stake of bank managers. The 
authors associated this finding with self-interested behaviour of bank managers.  
Studies Analysing Bank Failures, using Samples from Developing Countries 
The second strand consists of a few recent studies analysing bank failures, using samples 
from developing countries. These studies generally do not analyse bank M&A. Studies in this 
strand include Dabos and Escudero (2004) (Argentina), Sales and Tannuri-Pianto (2004) 
(Brazil), and Soyibo et al. (2004) (Nigeria). Dabos and Escudero (2004) and Sales and Tannuri-
Pianto (2004) used duration models to examine the role played by bank-specific characteristics 
that increase the probability of bank failures. They found that banks that are illiquid, low quality 
assets or low capital are more likely to fail. In addition to bank-specific characteristics, they 
found also that sectoral shocks (Eg. decline in agricultural and energy prices), macroeconomic 
factors, and industry-specific factors were also important. 
Soyibo et al. (2004) used logit models for both cross-sectional and panel data of Nigerian 
banks to examine specific conditions that accounted for bank distress during 1990s. In their 
cross-sectional logit estimation, they found that the likelihood of bank distress/failure decreases 
with bank’s earnings/profitability and less risky loan portfolio (measured as higher rates of 
proportion of agricultural loans in their loan portfolio). The likelihood of distress increased in 
government owned banks and in older generation banks. The authors found similar results in 
their panel data logit estimation, particularly for operating efficiency (i.e. using of costly funds), 
ownership, and older generation. In addition, they found that poorly capitalised banks and banks 
not quoted on the stock exchange market tend to be in distress. 
In the next section, we show some limitations of the theoretical and associated empirical 
evidence. Specifically, we explore the concepts of unassisted and assisted bank M&A in order to 
understand the influence of the regulatory environment on exit of banks. The aim is to show how 
regulatory authorities such as the CBN can influence M&A decisions. This is necessary for a 
clear understanding of the major research issues arising from the Nigerian banking consolidation 
program.  
3.3 The Concepts of Unassisted and Assisted Bank Consolidation  
The concepts of unassisted and assisted bank M&A are central to understanding the influence of 
the regulatory environment on M&A decisions of banks. Banking M&A are potentially 
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beneficial to the extent that they yield synergies, reduce the cost of doing business, and the 
sector’s competitiveness are enhanced locally and globally (Soludo 2004, Kwan 2004).  
However, the synergies potentially arising from M&A can also raise issues of public policy 
interest. Banking consolidation through M&A will alter the banking market structure, which may 
raise antitrust concerns. Antitrust concerns arise if consolidation results in concentration of the 
local market in the hands of a few large banks and increases their market power. Increase in 
market power in turn may increase prices of banking services (Olajide 2005). Also, emergence 
of a few megabanks increases potentials for systemic risks arising from exposure to default risk 
(Kwan 2004).  
Unassisted M&A take place under a high degree of regulatory oversights in which an M&A 
decision is jointly undertaken by the controlling directors and shareholders of acquiring and 
target banks. In this case, the banking regulator merely approves the M&A transaction, having 
satisfied that the M&A is unlikely to raise public concerns. On the other hand, M&A decisions 
are assisted when the regulatory authority assists in facilitating M&A between acquiring and 
target banks. Such assistance has the benefit of reducing uncertainties and costs associated with 
information asymmetries (adverse selection) during merger negotiations.  Assistance can take 
several forms including facilitating liquidation procedures, writing-off of debts, and 
compensating the creditors/depositors of the failing bank.
8
  
Ely and Song (2000) compared motivations for mergers in unassisted and assisted M&A in 
US banks during 1990s using different measures of M&A decision. They found that merger 
motive differ significantly between unassisted and assisted mergers, and how M&A decision was 
measured. When M&A decision was measured by the value of asset acquired, they found 
evidence supporting the wealth maximisation hypothesis for unassisted mergers relative to when 
measured by the number of completed M&A transactions. However, the authors found no 
evidence supporting either the wealth maximisation or the managerial self-interest hypothesis in 
assisted mergers, irrespective of how M&A decision was measured.  
The above paragraphs show potential influence of banking regulatory authorities on M&A 
decisions; by facilitating it, by preventing bank failures, as well as ensuring that public interests 
are protected. This raises important questions that are central to understanding the determinants 
                                                 
8
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of exit behaviour of banks, particularly in a developing country context. The theoretical literature 
identifies motivations for bank M&As. The empirical evidences, though largely inconclusive, are 
generally consistent with the wealth maximisation motives of M&A decisions. This is whereby a 
large, well-capitalised and efficient bank acquires a smaller, less efficient, low capitalised bank. 
In this case, the acquiring bank is able to correct any deficiencies of the target bank, thereby 
improving performance in the emerging bank. In addition to macroeconomic and industry 
specific factors, evidence from developing countries shows that characteristics that make a bank 
an acquisition target can also increase the likelihood of bank failure. However, certain 
conceptual and related empirical questions limit the extent to which results from these studies 
can be generalised to explain banking exit behaviour process in recent consolidation programs 
across a number of developing countries, particularly the Nigerian consolidation program. We 
highlight some of these related questions below. 
3.4 Different Institutional Contexts in which Bank Consolidation Occur 
In contrast to bank consolidation through M&A occurring under high degree of regulatory 
oversights (unassisted M&As), recent experiences mainly from developing countries (Eg; 
Turkey, Malaysia, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Nigeria) demonstrate that banking 
consolidation can be effectively induced by regulatory or reform policy.
9
  
In a developing country context, banking consolidation through M&A form an important 
component of broader banking sector reforms, which result from deliberate regulatory policy 
designed to reform the banking sector and prevent banking crisis that may result in mass failures. 
In this context, bank consolidation is part of a wider national objective of ensuring an efficient, 
developmental and growth oriented banking with greater incentive to improving overall 
economic performance and society welfare (Imala 2005). The context of regulatory policy-
induced bank consolidation raises important empirical questions that leave gaps in existing 
understanding of determinants of exit behaviour of banks.  
There is need to understand whether the resulting M&A are intended to prevent bank 
failures or the merging banks pursuing their wealth maximisation interests. Comparing evidences 
from the identified strands of studies, it would appear that characteristics that make a bank an 
acquisition target also tend to increase the likelihood of bank failure. Whether this is indeed the 
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case is purely an empirical question that we seek to examine in this paper. As an implication of 
the wealth maximisation theory, that a bank becomes a target for M&A does not necessarily 
imply that such a bank will fail. However, a bank can also be acquired just before it fails.  
Therefore, we seek to understand those bank characteristics that may explain the emergence 
of the M&A banks side-by-side failed banks. If the consolidation exercise were intended to 
prevent bank failures (i.e. meeting the minimum capitalisation requirement) then bank specific 
characteristics might not matter. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Bank specific characteristics did not matter for the emergence of the M&A banks. 
The Role of Incentives Provided by the CBN 
The Ely and Song (2000) study (cited earlier) showed the importance of the role of the 
regulatory authority in facilitating M&A decisions relative to sheer wealth maximisation motives 
of acquiring banks. The result suggests the need to understand the role played by the CBN 
incentives in the observed exit outcomes, particularly given the different context in which 
Nigerian banking consolidation took place.  
Understanding the role played by the CBN incentives is of interest to policy makers, 
particularly in future design of implementation strategies that may accompany similar reform 
policies that affect other industries in the financial sector (eg. the insurance industry). A reform 
policy accompanied by a framework of incentives to facilitate M&A has the benefit of reducing 
uncertainties and potential (search) costs associated with information asymmetries (adverse 
selection) during merger negotiations. By eliminating uncertainties and reducing search costs, 
M&A negotiations are facilitated and should reduce the likelihood of failures (see Borek et al. 
2002). For example, improving the financially condition of banks in distress through debt write-
off can eliminate concerns for current liabilities of the target bank, thereby facilitating its merger 
with other banks.  
In the present paper therefore, we seek to address the counterfactual question of whether the 
merged banks would have failed had they not benefited from the CBN incentives.  This leads to 
our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The banks that benefited from the CBN incentives increased their probability of 
being merged or acquired.  
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, we shall treat the exit outcomes as potentially dependent.   
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Macroeconomic Conditions and Industry Factors with Contagion Effects on the Banking 
Industry. 
Unlike the US studies that focused mainly on M&A and bank specific characteristics, 
evidence from developing countries show the importance of macroeconomic conditions and 
industry specific factors having contagion effects on the banking industry in determining bank 
failures. Largely because these studies focused on only on bank failures however, the direction in 
which these additional factors tend to also influence M&A decisions is not obvious. In their 
study of Swiss firms, Bueher et al. (2005) found the impact of macroeconomic conditions on 
mergers and voluntary liquidations. The Nigerian banking consolidation program provides an 
opportunity to also test this hypothesis in the banking industry. 
Understanding the role played by macroeconomic conditions and contagion effects factors 
relative to other factors (CBN incentives and bank characteristics) are of interest to policy 
makers, particularly in timing of banking restructuring policy. For example, a period of business 
cycle in the economy may delay M&A decision among banks, thereby increasing the probability 
of failures, especially when there is time limit in which such M&A decisions have to be made. 
Our third hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3:  The prevailing macroeconomic conditions and industry specific factors had no 
effect on the exit behaviour of banks during the consolidation exercise. 
 
4. Methodology 
In this section, we show how we hope to test the stated hypotheses and to a larger extent address 
the research questions. Our main interest is not only to identify bank characteristics and other 
factors that determine bank M&A side-by-side bank failures, but also to examine whether those 
explaining M&A are different from those explaining bank failures in some systematic way. More 
importantly, we recognise the CBN incentive as a central variable that is potentially driving the 
observed exit outcomes. Thus, we consider the CBN ‘judgement’ underlying its incentive 
provision as a latent or unobserved random variable which induces dependence between the 
M&A and the failed banks. If this unobserved variable is not taken into account, the error terms 
in the model are potentially correlated. Therefore, we specify a semi-parametric bivariate 
competing risks model with a flexible specification of the outcome-specific baseline hazards. 
This specification allows for unrestricted correlation across the stochastic disturbances in the 
Agu et al.: Mergers and acquisitions
 32 
competing risks model. In the remaining part of this section, we present the model and associated 
data requirement. 
4.1 The Analytical Model 
We model exit behaviour of banks using a flexible bivariate competing risks model originally 
proposed by Han and Hausman (1990). Several extensions of the model had been applied in 
different settings (for example, Rosholm and Svarer (2001), Sueyoshi 1992, Fallick and Ryu 
2007, and others). The presentation of the model follows the standard competing risks 
framework as in Kalbleisch and Prentice (1978). A model of competing risks requires definition 
and a specification of the distribution for a set of observable quantities. The followings are 
defined: 
i) There are n number of banks at risk of exit, i = 1, 2,…………, n 
ii) j is the distinct exit mode, j (1, 2,…….,J).  
iii) T  0 is the time until event j occurs, given that the event has not occurred before. J is 
unobserved if T is censored. 
iv) X is a vector of bank characteristics and other determinants. Both continuous and discrete 
are included, X = X. 
Assuming discrete time periods t = 1,2,….T, the outcome-specific hazard function for the i
th
 
bank with X vector of covariates specified for j
th 
outcome is stated to include the corresponding 
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where jih (.) gives the hazard rate for the i
th
 bank from exit mode j at time t, given the vector of 
covariates X. The lower part of Eq. (1) shows the proportional hazard specification 
corresponding to the outcome-specific hazard function. )(0 th
j
i  0 is the outcome-specific 
baseline hazard, through which the form of dependence between M&A and failed banks can be 
examined.  
For the purpose of incorporating unobserved heterogeneity underlying the CBN incentive 
provision, the j
th
 outcome baseline hazard is specified in the log form of the integrated hazard: 
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);(log  is nonnegative outcome-specific error term, and its 
distribution is assumed to take an extreme value form. 
Following Han and Hausman (1990), the log of the integrated outcome-specific baseline 
hazards is assumed to be constant in each time period, so that
j
t
j t  )(0 , (t=1, 2, …T). 
Therefore, the hazard functions corresponding to the two exit modes (J=1, 2) by the i
th
 bank can 



















                                            (4)          
where 1t  and 
2
t  are the hazards of exit by M&A and bank failure, respectively; (j=1, 2) where 
1= M&A and 2= bank failure; t is the discrete time period within which the baseline hazard is 
assumed to be constant. X1 and X2 are vectors of covariates explaining exit by M&A and bank 
failure, respectively; 1 and 2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated for M&A and bank 























































 .  ensures that the required 
relationship between the observed and latent failure time obtains for each discrete time interval. 
The term ))1(( 22
2
0   iXt  is based on the assumption that for a given distribution of the 
error term for M&A, 1, the implied hazard rate for bank failure is greater than the implied 
hazard rate of M&A. In deriving this term, the evaluation points of support are assumed to 
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change linearly over the discrete interval (Han and Hausman 1990). The linearity assumption 
ensures computational simplicity as it serves as one of the identifying assumptions (Sueyoshi 
1992). The linearity assumption is reasonable in our application given the potential presence of 
tied observations in our data. Tied observations are present as exit of banks and censoring 
coincide with the end of the period stipulated by the CBN (December 31 2005).   
The term ),( 21 f  denotes the density function, which allows for possible correlation, thus 
permitting dependence between the error terms of the model.  Since j=1, 2; the specification in 
Eqs. (3) and (4) provide estimates of two sets of hazard functions jt( ), which gives a flexible 
parametric counterparts of both bank failure and M&A hazards. 
4.2 Inferences   
In application, inference is based on the specification of a log likelihood function corresponding 
to the bivariate specification of the competing risks model in Eqs (3) and (4). For the data setup, 
we assume that the n banks give rise to data which are observed at K discrete periods ti1 < ti2 < ---
-----ti, k-1, and are identical for all n banks. We also observed either M&A, failure, or the 
observation on the i
th
 bank is censored (i.e. stand alone banks) at time ti,ki. We assumed that data 
on X1 and X2 corresponding to time ti,ki , k = 1, 2,…., k-1 reflect measurable bank characteristics 
and other variables that may explain exit behaviour of banks. These variables may vary across 
intervals of time, but they are assumed to be constant within discrete time intervals.  
The censoring indicator di takes the value of 1 if exit mode is observed for the i
th
 bank and 
the value 0 otherwise; dji = 1 if the i
th
 bank exits by exit outcome j at time ti,ki  and 0 otherwise. 
We threat the stand-alone banks as censored (i.e. banks that meet the capitalisation requirement 
on their own), as exit mode j is not observed for this group of banks. 
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where  
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 tiXt  )))((( 111011   ; 

























  for t = 2, ….,k-1 with 1 = k = 1 
The log likelihood function in Eq. (6) is a function of j , where ),,( j
j
ojj   . Inference 
follows from the inverse of the Hessian matrix of the log likelihood function where a finite 
vector parameterises the stochastic terms in the specification (Han and Hausman 1990). The 
bivariate competing risks model proposed here allows for considerable flexibility in the 
specification of the baseline hazard, while maintaining a parametric form for the function of 
explanatory variables. Also, the model can easily accommodate features of discrete data such as 
tied observations and unobserved heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
‘Flexible’ of the model lies in the fact that the parametric assumption of the density function 
f does not impose any specific parametric forms on the outcome-specific baseline hazards. Thus, 
distribution assumptions that have been used can be also be employed, including a discrete 
bivariate distribution (Fallick and Ryu 2007, Rosholm and Svarer 2001) and bivariate log-normal 
distribution (Hans and Hausman 1990). Also, the flexible specification approach allows a 
straightforward introduction of unobserved heterogeneity underlying with CBN incentives, 
without the necessity of multiple integrations that would have arisen from the Cox proportional 
hazard model proposed previously. Hans and Hausman (1990) show that the non-parametric 
specification of the unobserved heterogeneity is convenient, easier to estimate, and yields an 
asymptotic (normal) estimator that is consistent with standard large sample.  
4.3 Identification 
A key issue in dependent competing risks models is identification of the key parameters. Lee 
(2005) shows how a transformed model can be used to identify important features of a dependent 
competing risks model, such as j, j0 , and the joint distribution of  ),( 21  . The key 
identification condition for the bivariate competing risks model is that the number of continuous 
variables is at least as great as the number of competing risks in the model, even if the Xj 
covariates are identical (Hans and Hausman 1986, 1988). This identification result and others 
have been applied in several studies, especially in empirical studies of unemployment durations 
(for example; Hans and Hausman 1990; Fallick and Ryu 2007, Sueyoshi 1992). In the present 
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application, this identification implies that at least two covariates of Xj in our dataset are 
continuous. In estimation of Eq. (3) and (4), we have identical explanatory variables; X1 = X2, 
consisting of both continuous and discrete variables. Other less stringent identification 
conditions include sufficient variations in the covariates; covariates are not perfectly collinear, 
and the j
th
 baseline hazards, j0 , are not perfectly related (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
4.4 Data Requirement  
This paper seeks to use the competing risks duration models to investigate the determinants of 
exit behaviour of banks in the Nigerian consolidation program. There is no consensus as to the 
type of data that provide the best estimates or the type of variables that should be considered in 
an analysis of bank M&A and failures. Studies cited earlier typically use both cross-sectional and 
panel data of banks. In their application of logit models, Soyibo et al. (2004) found similar 
results using both cross-sectional and panel data.  
However, because duration analysis is based on specific time covered in the study, panel 
data have been found to provide better estimates in duration models generally relative to cross-
sectional data. Also, using both time-varying covariates rather than only non-time varying 
covariates had been found to increase the predictive power of models using panel data relative to 
similar cross-section models (Sales and Tannuri-Pianto 2005). The only study that has compared 
banking failure and acquisition (Wheelock and Wilson 2000) used explanatory variables 
representing only time-varying bank-specific characteristics.  
In the present paper therefore, we propose to use a panel data of all the 89 banks operating in 
Nigeria during the period January 2001 – December 31 2005. Data for the period 2001-2004 will 
be used to estimate the competing risks model. Using the data from three years before the 
program will allow us to account for performance history of the individual banks. 
 
5. Estimation Methods and Findings 
Estimations were carried out at two stages. The first stage involved estimating two models using 
the standard competing risks models, consisting of bank level model (‘Model 1’), and controlling 
industry specific and economy wide effects in ‘Model 2’. In both models, bank failure and M&A 
were treated as independent risks; and the key dependence variable (CBN incentive) was 
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included as an explanatory variable in the failure hazard equation. Table 4 presents estimation 
results for the independence case.   
At the second stage of the analysis, we focused on the structural dependence among the 
determinants. The CBN assistance is the key variable inducing the structural dependence 
between failure and M&A. Thus, we modelled the CBN assistance explicitly as a function of the 
political/ethnic considerations underlying the consolidation programme and other relevant 
variables. The CBN assistance and failure probabilities were jointly estimated, allowing the 
failure probability to affect CBN assistance. Explicit specification of a CBN assistance equation 
has an added advantage of attempting to examine potential heterogeneity underlying CBN 
incentives directly.  Tables 4 and 5 present estimation results. 
5.1 Independent Competing Risks Case 
Bank characteristics: Age of bank (Bankage) has a quadratic effect on failure hazard; with 
failure hazard increasing in relatively younger banks and decreases in older banks. The critical 
age (inflection point) is at approximately 18.5 years in ‘Model 1’, suggesting that banks below 
18.5 years were more likely than older banks to fail. The average age of failed banks is 
approximately 14 years, which is below the sample average of approximately 16 years. Thus, the 
increasing part of the quadratic function is relevant for failure hazard. A quadratic effect was 
also observed on the M&A hazard, but the effect is statistically not different zero.  
The number of branches is a measure of size of banks. However, this has no effect on either 
failure or M&A probabilities. As expected, the share of small-medium enterprises loans in a 
bank’s total loans (Smeloans) increased the risk of failure and decreased the M&A probability. 
Comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients, the extent to which increasing Smeloans increases 
the likelihood of failure appears stronger than the extent to which it decreases the likelihood of 
M&A. 
The risk of bank failure decreases with shareholders fund, but has no effect on M&A 
probability. However, the capital base of the bank significantly decreases the probability of 
M&A, but has no effect on the risk of bank failure.  
 
The share of private ownership provides an indication of efficiency of operations (ref.). Share of 
private ownership strongly reduced the risk of failure but did not increase the probability of 
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M&A either. However, the decreasing effect of share of private ownership on risk of failure was 
much stronger than the decreasing effect on probability of M&A.  
CBN assistance (cbnassist) is key variable of interest in the analysis, as it provides an 
indication of the CBN attempt to assist weaker banks towards M&A. As expected, CBN 
assistance strongly reduced the risk of bank failure and increased the probability of M&A. 
Comparing the magnitudes of the effects, the extent to which CBN assistance reduced bank 
failure was significantly larger than the extent to which it increased M&A probability.  
The share of non-performing loans in total loans provides an indication of the bank’s credit risk. 
As expected, higher non-performing loans significantly increased the risk of bank failure, but no 
statistically significant effect on the probability of M&A. However, the coefficient of the 
interaction of non-performing loans with CBN assistance showed that the risk of failure declined 
significantly and probability of M&A increased significantly if the bank were to be CBN 
assisted, compared to when the bank was not assisted.  
The state of origin of bank CEOs was used to proxy the geo-political/ethnic dimensions of 
the consolidation programme and to some extent capture the heterogeneity between banks. 
Compared to the baseline category of bank CEOs (South-west), the risk of failure increased 
significantly if the bank CEO hailed from the South-south or South-east geo-political zone, while 
the risk of bank failure decreased significantly if the bank CEO hailed from the Northern geo-
political/ethnic zone or foreigner. However, the state of origin of bank CEO has no effect on the 
probability of M&A. The above results changed dramatically when the state of origin of bank 
CEOs was interacted with non-performing loans. Compared to the baseline category, the risk of 
failure reduced significantly if the CEO hailed from the South-south or South-east geo-political 
zone, while the risk of bank failure increased significantly if the bank CEO hailed from the 
Northern geo-political/ethnic zone. The state of origin of banks generally has no effects on the 
probability of M&A.  
Industry specific and economy wide characteristics: Following the literature on 
determinants of bank failure and M&A, we included index of manufacturing production and 
agricultural loans for the period 2001-2003 to control for industry and economic wide covariates, 
respectively (Model 2). However, the inclusion of these factors did not change the results. There 
was no statistical evidence that these factors were influential in determining the exit behaviour of  
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Table 4: Determinants of Exit of Banks: Independence Case 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Variables Failure M&A Failure Bank failure 
Bank characteristics:     
Bankage 2.446*** 0.0330 2.446*** 0.0330 
 (0.595) (0.0267) (0.595) (0.0267) 
Bankage Sq. -0.0659*** -0.000249 -0.0659*** -0.000249 
 (0.0155) (0.000584) (0.0155) (0.000584) 
Critical age 
a








Branches 0.0125 -0.000741 0.0125 -0.000741 
 (0.00852) (0.000736) (0.00852) (0.000736) 
Smeloans 0.615*** -0.0444*** 0.615*** -0.0444*** 
 (0.124) (0.0163) (0.124) (0.0163) 
Shareholders fund -0.940*** -0.0525 -0.940*** -0.0523 
 (0.352) (0.123) (0.352) (0.123) 
Capital base -0.107 -0.0728* -0.107 -0.0729* 
 (0.108) (0.0380) (0.108) (0.0380) 
Share of private ownership -2.874*** -0.255*** -2.874*** -0.255*** 
 (0.676) (0.0881) (0.676) (0.0882) 
CBN assist -20.90*** 0.408*** -20.89*** 0.408*** 
 (1.510) (0.149) (1.514) (0.149) 
Non-performing loans 0.279*** -0.00442 0.279*** -0.00442 
 (0.0732) (0.00858) (0.0732) (0.00858) 
Non-performingloans*CNB assist -0.1903** 0.0159** -0.1903** -0.1903** 
 (0. 059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0. 059) 
Bank CEO (SS/SE) 5.592** 0.0587 5.592** 0.0587 
 (2.480) (0.374) (2.480) (0.374) 
Bank CEO (North) -31.18*** 0.271 -31.18*** 0.271 
 (7.760) (0.287) (7.760) (0.287) 
Bank CEO (Foreign) -4.390* -0.871** -4.390* -0.871** 
 (2.346) (0.437) (2.346) (0.437) 
Non-performing loans*CEO(SS/SE) -0.178*** 0.000206 -0.178*** 0.000201 
 (0.0624) (0.0129) (0.0624) (0.0129) 
Non-performing loans*CEO(North) 0.683*** -0.0164 0.683*** -0.0164 
 (0.173) (0.0123) (0.173) (0.0123) 
Non-performing loans*CEO (For.) 0.0737 0.0159 0.0737 0.0159 
 (0.0638) (0.0157) (0.0638) (0.0157) 
Industry and Economy wide variables:     
Index of manufacturing production   -0.00107 -0.00498 
   (0.746) (0.343) 
Agric loan   0.0293 0.136 
   (23.33) (10.72) 
N 267 267 267 267 
Model fit statistics:     
Deviance  321.41 2296.88 321.41 2296.88 
AIC 351.41 2326.88 355.41 2330.88 
AIB 405.22 2380.69 416.39 2391.87 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a
 critical age is obtained by using the 
STATA v.10 command nlcom on estimated (Bankage) / (-2*Bankage sq.). AIC: Akaike’s information criterion; BIC: 
Bayesian information criterion; Deviance: -2*log likelihood. 
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banks in the consolidation programme.
10
 This result may be reflecting the fact that there were 
little variations in these variables during the period considered in this analysis. 
5.2 Structural Dependence between Failure and M&A Hazards Induced By CBN Incentive  
In the joint estimation of the failure and CBN assistance probabilities as described earlier, we 
also compared the Hans and Hausman (1990) and extended by Rosholm and Svarer (2001) 
approach by incorporating the failure hazard into the CBN assistance (‘Model 3’) with Fukumoto 
(2005) by explicitly estimate the dependence parameter (‘Model 4’). Table 5 presents estimation 
results for the structural dependence case. The quadratic effect of bank age remained consistent. 
However, the critical age at which a bank is more likely to fail was reduced slightly from the 
independent competing risks case. Interestingly, bank age became influential in determining 
whether a bank received CBN assistance.  
Compared with the mean age of 16 years in the data, the critical age at which a bank was 
more likely to receive CBN assistance is approximately below 26 years. This is consistent with 
the mean age of approximately 18 years for banks that received the CBN incentive (comparable 
to the critical age below which banks were more likely to fail). In terms of structural dependence 
between failure and M&A therefore, this result seems to suggest that more banks that would 
have failed by virtue of their age above 18 years were less likely to do so if they receive CBN 
assistance. 
Other strong predictors of bank failure in the structural dependence case include 
vulnerability of banks to external shocks (as measured by SME loans), non-performing loans 
(much stronger than in the independent competing risks case), especially if the bank CEO hailed 
from the Northern geo-political/ethnic zone of the country. The remaining results remained 
generally consistent with the independent competing risks case, though the magnitudes of the 
coefficients appear to differ. 
On the other hand, strong predictors of CBN assistance include age of bank and 
vulnerability to external shocks. There was also a geo-political/ethnic dimension to the 
probability of CBN assistance. Compared to the baseline category, banks whose CEO hailed 
from the South-south or South-east geo-political/ethnic zone were strongly less likely to receive 
                                                 
10
 We also experimented with other variables including such as forbearance and public confidence did not change 
the result. 
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CBN assistance. If non-performing loans were considered however, banks whose CEO hailed 
from the Northern geo-political/ethnic zone were strongly more likely to receive CBN assistance. 
Table 5: Determinants of Bank Failure with Structural Dependence 
 Model 3  Model 4  
VARIABLES Failure CBN assist Failure CBN assist 
     
Bankage 1.117* 0.228*** 1.053* 0.360*** 
 (0.594) (0.0817) (0.548) (0.139) 
Bankage sq. -0.0315* -0.00438** -0.0293** -0.00781** 











Smeloans 0.487*** 0.0869* 0.500*** 0.0883* 
 (0.134) (0.0483) (0.132) (0.0537) 
Shareholders fund -1.482***  -1.550***  
 (0.505)  (0.497)  
Capital base -0.142  -0.136  
 (0.139)  (0.137)  
Share of private ownership -1.031*  -1.034*  
 (0.606)  (0.627)  
Non-performing loans 8.175*** 0.469 8.491*** 0.313 
 (2.015) (0.537) (1.907) (0.528) 
Bank CEO (SS/SE) -41.82*** -1.307*** -63.24*** -31.03** 
 (12.58) (0.310) (10.47) (12.65) 
Bank CEO (North) -17.25** -0.263 -17.27*** -0.626 
 (6.768) (0.510) (6.559) (0.482) 
Bank CEO (Foreign) 0.274***  0.282***  
 (0.0691)  (0.0663)  
Non-performing loans*CEO(SS/SE) -0.266*** -0.0141 -0.276*** -0.00966 
 (0.0629) (0.0158) (0.0589) (0.0158) 
Non-performing loans*CEO(North) 0.958*** 0.0369*** 1.620*** 0.918** 
 (0.281) (0.0110) (0.284) (0.369) 
Non-performing loans*CEO(For.) 0.416**  0.414** 0.0241* 
 (0.185)  (0.179) (0.0145) 
Dependence:     
Dependence parameter   -12.21***  -1.516 
  (1.906)  (1.614) 
Failed (exittype=2)    -15.35*** 
    (4.042) 
Constant -12.63* -4.435*** -12.05* -5.589*** 
 (6.602) (1.033) (6.429) (1.639) 
     
N 267 267 267 267 
Deviance 211.76  200.42  
AIC 255.76  252.42  
AIB 334.68  345.69  
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a
 critical age is obtained by using the 
STATA v.10 command nlcom on estimated (Bankage) / (-2*Bankage sq.). AIC: Akaike’s information criterion; BIC: 
Bayesian information criterion; Deviance: -2*log likelihood. 
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from the South-south or South-east geo-political/ethnic zone were strongly less likely to receive 
CBN assistance. If non-performing loans were considered however, banks whose CEO hailed 
from the Northern geo-political/ethnic zone were strongly more likely to receive CBN assistance. 
In the raw data, the mean non-performing loans was approximately 26.3% in the baseline 
category, where the bank CEO hailed from the South-west compared with approximately 30.4% 
and 27.8% where the bank CEO hailed from the South-south/East and the North, respectively. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the CBN assistance on the basis of the geo-political/ethnic 
appeal of the bank CEOs was sensitive to the magnitude of non-performing loans they have 
approved.  
The coefficient of the dependence parameter showed a strong negative correlation between 
CBN assistance and bank failure (‘Model 3’). Similar results were obtained when the failure 
hazard was allowed to affect CBN assistance, with strong negative correlation (‘Model 4’). Also, 
the fact that the significance of the coefficient of dependence parameter disappeared in ‘Model 
4’, suggesting that allowing the failure hazard to affect the CBN assistance adequately captured 
the structural dependence.  
Finally, comparing the Deviance, AIC, and AIB fit statistics across all the estimated models, 
it appears that taking into account the structural dependence induced by the CBN assistance 
provide better fit for the data.  On the basis of Deviance and AIC criteria, allowing the failure 
hazard to affect the CBN assistance appears to provide a better fit for the structural dependence 
models. If the AIB criterion is also considered, it is not immediately clear which of the structural 
dependence models provides the best fit. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This result conforms to expectation that CBN incentive provision prevented banks that would 
otherwise have failed. The influences on CBN assistance also became clearer, with older banks 
more likely to receive CBN assistance (more than the critical age below which the risk of failure 
increased). Six out of the nine banks that the CBN assisted were aged below 18 years. Also, it 
appeared that the CBN was sympathetic to those banks that were more vulnerable to external 
shocks by the proportion of SME loans in total loans. In the past, the CBN had encouraged banks 
to increase their SME loans to support the development and growth of SMEs in Nigeria (Sanusi 
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2003). The average SME loans by CBN-assisted bank was approximately 12% points higher 
than the overall industry average. This may explain the positive association.  
Also, there was a clear geo-political/ethnicity gradient in the exit behaviour of banks. 
Looking at the state of origin of bank CEOs alone, it would appear that the banks from the 
northern geo-political/ethnic zone were favoured or prevented from failure. But this was true 
only if the non-performing loans were not considered, because the risk of failure increased 
significantly higher than if the CEO hailed from the South-west once the non-performing loans 
were considered. The reverse was the case for the banks from the South-south or South-east geo-
political/ethnic zone, in which the risk of failure reduced significantly. Thus, it appears that the 
non-performing loans factor (the credit risk of banks) affected the northern banks relative to their 
southern counterparts. Finally we found no evidence supporting the argument by Ezeoha (2007) 
that the economy wide situation in the country would influence the outcomes of the 
consolidation programme.  
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